Res Publica - Journal of Undergraduate Research
Volume 13

Issue 1

Article 7

2008

Killer Amendments and Strategic Voting in the Senate
Erin Strauts
Illinois Wesleyan University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/respublica

Recommended Citation
Strauts, Erin (2008) "Killer Amendments and Strategic Voting in the Senate," Res
Publica - Journal of Undergraduate Research: Vol. 13
Available at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/respublica/vol13/iss1/7
This Article is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital
Commons @ IWU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this material in any
way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For
other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights
are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/ or on the work itself. This material
has been accepted for inclusion by editorial board of Res Publica and the Political Science
Department at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.

Killer Amendments and Strategic Voting in the Senate
Abstract
One place we still do not understand senators’ voting patterns is the arena of strategic votes. Every
senator has a set of preferences on the issues; however, researchers cannot reach into the brains of
senators to extract these vital positions. The goal of this paper is to determine whether killer
amendments induce strategic voting in the Senate, using data from the 109th Congress.
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KILLER AMENDMENTS AND STRATEGIC VOTING IN THE SENATE
A Research Note
Erin Strauts

Introduction
Understanding the inner workings of legislatures should be a central objective of those
wishing to comprehend and evaluate the work of democracies. In the modern United States
Senate the votes of senators can be predicted with 85 percent accuracy (Poole and Rosenthal
1997). Legislators are likely to vote with their party, but when they do not vote with their
ideological brethren we often cannot explain their motives.
One place we still do not understand senators’ voting patterns is the arena of strategic
votes. Every senator has a set of preferences on the issues; however, researchers cannot reach
into the brains of senators to extract these vital positions. Traditionally, legislator preferences are
inferred from their votes on bills and amendments, but these votes may not be a reliable measure.
The legislator may vote against an amendment because he or she believes it will decrease the
chances of getting their least favored outcome on the bill and not because of his or her attitude
toward the amendment itself. This would be a strategic vote. The type of amendment which
provokes this kind of strategic vote is a “killer” or a “poison pill” amendment. These
amendments manipulate the agenda by interjecting a step before the vote on the bill which
lowers the chance of the bill passing. The goal of this paper is to determine whether killer
amendments really do induce strategic voting in the Senate, using data from the 109th Congress.

Data and Methods
To test whether amendments cause strategic voting I used two measures: the DNOMINATE scores developed by Poole and Rosenthal1 and my own Weighted Error Score
based on the ideas of Poole and Rosenthal.
The D-NOMINATE score (Dynamic NOMINAl Three-step Estimation) is a score given
to each individual senator and is based on all the roll call votes he or she has made in the senate.
The first dimension score, which is used here, is a measure of the legislator’s ideology and
partisanship. The score ranges from -1 as extremely liberal to 1 as extremely conservative. It is
not an absolute measure of ideology, but rather ranks legislators relative to their peers.
The Weighted Error Score (WES) is a measure of the number of classification errors
(predicted nay, but actual yea and vice versa) found at the liberal and conservative ends of the
NOMINATE scale. The location of the cutting point (divide between the predicted yeas and the
nays) is essential to finding the classification errors. I found the cutting point by calculating the
median NOMINATE score for the yeas and again for the nays. The cutting point is the average
of the two medians. If the yeas have a more negative median than the nays, then liberals are
predicted to vote yea and conservatives nay. Classification errors are expected to exist around the
cutting point, but strategic voting should have errors at the ends of the scale. WES penalizes for
errors very far from the cut point and for a large number of errors. The higher the WES the more
likely a vote is to have been strategic.
1

The NOMINATE data used can be found on Keith Poole’s website, www.voteview.com
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WES = Σ | NOMINATEscorei – cut point | * # ofErrors

In order to collect the data, I searched the Congressional Record for mentions of killer,
poison pill, and gutting amendments.2 By using the Congressional Record instead of a data
driven method, this project makes two assumptions. First, in order to have an incentive to vote
strategically on the amendment a legislator must know that the amendment is indeed a killer
amendment. Second, if the legislator knows it is a killer he or she will tell the other legislators.

Findings
After finding the killers, I sampled non-killers and calculated the WES for all the votes. I
then ran a t-test on the two groups to test the significance of the average difference in scores. The
average WES score for the killers was 25.60 and 15.53 for the non-killers, a difference of 10.06.
The t-test gave a p-value of .63 which is not significant. The hypothesis of strategic voting being
induced by killers is not supported by the WES scores. The total number of killers found in the
109th Senate equaled 17 (10 in the first session and 7 in the second session) out of over 600
votes. This small sample size made it nearly impossible to achieve significance. With the given
difference and variation, a p-value of .05 would require a sample size of 280 killer amendments.3

Conclusions
While the WES did not prove to be significant, some evidence was still found that
some of the amendments were killers. Killer amendments and strategic votes have gotten quite a
bit of attention in recent years, but there is still much more that is worth learning. It seems that
legislators do not take much advantage of strategic actions in Congress. While this makes
Congress easier for the masses to understand, I would argue that it is normatively better to have a
Congress aware enough to act sophisticatedly.
Research on a grander scale then that already tried needs to be done. A comprehensive
database of all known killers needs to be created in order to achieve sample sizes large enough to
test differences between killers and non-killers and between subgroups within the set of killers.
Since the number of legislators who actually vote strategically on killers is fairly low, the
differences between the strategic voters and the non-strategic voters should be analyzed.

2

Searching the Congressional Record for key phrases was the idea of Wilkerson. He was able to find the killers, but
his results were insignificant (Wilkerson 1999). However the measure Wilkerson used to test the killers included
errors close to the cutting point which may have drowned out the differences between killers and non-killers.
3
t = ( Xbarkiller – Xbarnon ) / sqr( Varkiller/nkiller + Varnon/nnon ), for a p-value of .05 the equation must be greater than a
t-value of 1.96

